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THE RISE OF RIGHTS-BASED CLIMATE LITIGATION
AND GERMANY’S SUSCEPTIBILITY TO SUIT
Marc Zemel*
INTRODUCTION
Recent trends in climate activism point to more litigation. Plaintiffs
are bringing claims against corporations,1 regulatory agencies,2 and
governments as a whole3 to force an energy transition that they see as
too slow and insufficient. In particular, recent rulings in several
jurisdictions around the world have breathed life into rights-based
constitutional claims against national governments for failing to
protect their citizens through climate change mitigation and
adaptation. Even state actors with relatively “good” climate policies,
such as Switzerland, have not escaped suit.4 As courts give credence
* Marc Zemel is an attorney with the Seattle, WA law firm Smith & Lowney PLLC
and wrote this article as a Robert Bosch Stiftung fellow in Berlin. The author would
like to thank Professor Dr. Michael Kloepfer of the Humboldt Unversität Law
Faculty and the staff at Forschungszentrum Umweltrecht for generously hosting him
while working on this article.
1.See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Schneiderman, No. 17-CV-2301 (VEC), 2018 WL
1605572 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2018) (transferred from N.D. Tex. March 29, 2017);
Santa Cruz v. Chevron, Case No. 17CV03243 (Santa Cruz County Superior Court,
filed December 20, 2017); Saúl Luciano Lliuya v. RWE AG, Higher Regional Court
of Hamm (Nov. 30, 2017), translated in https://germanwatch.org/en/
download/20812.pdf; Attracta Mooney & Ed Crooks, New York Sues Big Oil
Companies Over Climate Change, THE FINANCIAL TIMES (Jan. 11, 2018),
https://www.ft.com/content/4de8e4fc-f62b-11e7-88f7-5465a6ce1a00
[http://perma.cc/BMX2-3ZHP].
2. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 522-23 (2007).
3. See id. at 506-7.
4. See Jan Burck, Franziska Marten & Christoph Bals, Climate Change
Performance Index: Results 2017, GERMAN WATCH AND CLIMATE ACTION
NETWORK, 12 (2017), https://germanwatch.org/en/download/16484.pdf (indicating
Switzerland is the 14th best performer on climate change, but concluding that “No
country is doing enough to prevent dangerous climate change.”); Verein
KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz v. Schweizerische Bundeskanzlei, Complaint (Swiss
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to these novel legal theories – which range from alleged violations of
fiduciary duties to violations of the fundamental rights to life and
property –the frequency of rights-based climate lawsuits will likely
increase.
Among industrialized nations, Germany is an excellent example
where no one has yet brought a climate-related constitutional claim
against the government, but where a suit seems inevitable. Germany is
missing its 2020 emissions reduction target so badly that the new
governing coalition that emerged from the 2017 federal election
debated abandoning the target altogether.5 Indeed, despite positioning
itself as a leader on climate change, Germany is a favorable target for
a rights-based suit due to (1) it backsliding on emissions reduction
promises, (2) its liberal access to justice policies for constitutional
claims,6 (3) its affirmative constitutional duty to protect fundamental
rights, and (4) an enumerated constitutional state goal to “protect the
natural foundations of life” with a “responsibility toward future
generations.”7

Federal
Administrative
Court,
Nov.
25,
2016),
translated
in
http://klimaseniorinnen.ch/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/request_
KlimaSeniorinnen.pdf.
5. For a critique of the latest climate-change related news related to the Grand
Coalition agreement, see Niklas Höhne, Germany’s New Government Deal Fails the
Paris Climate Accord Test, CLIMATE HOME NEWS (Mar. 12, 2018),
http://www.climatechangenews.com/2018/03/12/germanys-new-government-dealfails-paris-climate-accord-test/. See also, Guy Chazan & Tobias Buck, Carbon
Targets on the Table in German Coalition Talks, THE FINANCIAL TIMES (Jan. 8,
2018),
https://www.ft.com/content/d2572cec-f470-11e7-88f7-5465a6ce1a00.
Germany had set a goal of reducing its GHG by 40 percent below the 1990 level by
2020. Germany’s target is a component of the European Union (EU) Nationally
Determined Contribution (NDC) under the Paris Agreement, which pledged to
reduce the Union’s emissions by 40 percent below 1990 levels by 2030. See Intended
Nationally Determined Contribution of the EU and its Member States, LATVIAN
PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (Mar. 6, 2015),
http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/PublishedDocuments/European%20 Union%20
First/LV-03-06-EU%20INDC.pdf.
6. See Grundgesetz [GG][Basic Law] art. 93(1)(4a) translated in
https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf;
Bundesverfassungsgerichtgeset [BverfGG] [Federal Constitutional Court Act], at
§90(1) (Ger.).
7. Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law] art. 20(a) translated in https://www.btgbestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf.
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This article proceeds in three parts. First, this article addresses the
rise of rights-based climate litigation as a tool to force governments to
more aggressively respond to climate change. Next, it traces some of
the most recent developments in rights-based climate litigation in
national courts within the European Union, with particular focus on
Urgenda v. The Netherlands and Friends of the Irish Environment v.
Ireland, et al. Finally, this Article explores the availability and
evaluates the susceptibility of the Federal Republic of Germany to
similar rights-based climate-related claims under the German
Grundgesetz (G.G.).8 Germany is widely viewed as a leader on climate
change mitigation. However, Germany is not following through with
its commitments and it remains a significant GHG emitter, as
exemplified by its continued reliance on coal and other fossil fuels.
The strong activist psyche of its citizens suggests that a rights-based
climate suit is highly likely in the Federal Constitutional Court. To be
sure, such a suit faces significant hurdles and success is far from
certain. However, there are several constitutional claims to be made.
I.

THE RISE OF RIGHTS-BASED CLIMATE LITIGATION

There is scientific and diplomatic consensus about the threats that
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions pose and the levels of reduction
needed to avert the worst effects of anthropogenic climate change.9 In
an unprecedented expression of global unity, every nation on the
planet10 (at least until the United States withdraws from the Paris
Accord in 2020)11 has agreed to the principles stated in the Paris
Accord, including, “[h]olding the increase in the global average
8. “Basic Law,” “Grundgesetz,” and “Constitution” are used interchangeably in
this article.
9. See, e.g., Rajendra K. Pachauri et. al., Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report
(2014), INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 2 (2014),
http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/syr/.
10. Syria, the last holdout, joined the Paris Accord in November 2017. Lisa
Friedman, Syria Joins Paris Climate Accord, Leaving Only U.S. Opposed, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/07/climate/syria-joinsparis-agreement.html [http://perma.cc/5F7K-V8EJ].
11. Although the United States has already expressed its intention to withdraw
from Paris, under the terms of the agreement, it is unable to do so until 2020. See
Paris Agreement, U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 28, Dec. 12,
2016, U.N. DOC. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 Apr. 22, 2016.
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temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and
pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above preindustrial levels. . . .”12 Yet, GHG emissions continue to rise,13 and the
gaps between state action and the Paris Accord’s goal highlight the
inadequacy of traditional political processes to address this challenge.
The combination of dire forecasts for the planet’s climate and the
diminishing pathways for mitigation motivate aggrieved parties to
bring rights-based claims. In 2017 during the 23rd conference of
parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Bonn, Germany (COP 23),14 the UN
published troubling conclusions about current emission trends:
countries are falling short of their national emission reduction targets,
and even if all the parties met their reduction pledges, it would still not
be enough to meet the Paris Accord’s objective.15
Critics of the plodding pace of tangible governmental responses are
concluding that political branches of government are simply not up to
the task to implement policies that are sufficiently aggressive to avert
the worst effects of climate change.16 This faithlessness in political
leaders breeds various forms of protest and direct actions. For
example, on the eve of COP 23, several thousand demonstrators
occupied one of the largest open pit coal mine in Europe, just 50 km
away from the COP 23 venue in Germany.17 At the end of the
12. Paris Agreement, U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, art.
2(1)(a), Dec. 12, 2016, U.N. DOC. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 Apr. 22, 2016
[hereinafter, Paris Agreement].
13. Brad Plumer & Nadja Popovich, CO2 Emissions Were Flat for Three Years.
Now They’re Rising Again, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2017/11/13/climate/co2-emissions-rising-again.html
(citing
three
scientific journals) [http://perma.cc/2XB3-P46X].
14. Although it took place in Bonn, Germany, COP23 was hosted by Fiji.
15. The Emissions Gap Report 2017, A UN Environment Synthesis Report, U.N.
ENV’T PROGRAMME (Nov. 2017), https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/
20.500.11822/22070/EGR_2017.pdf.
16. See e.g. Karl S. Coplan, Fossil Fuel Abolition: Legal and Social Issues, 41
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 233, 225 (2016) (“There is no realistic prospect that sustainable
global controls on greenhouse gas emissions will be adopted in the next decade.
Instead, the global community is on track to surpass the one teraton available in the
next fifteen to twenty years.”).
17. Jonathan Watts, Germany’s Dirty Coalmines Become the Focus for a New
Wave
of
Direct
Action,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Nov.
8,
2017)
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/nov/08/germanys-dirty-
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conference activists also occupied and disrupted a nearby coal-fired
power plant.18 Participants in these actions hoped to influence policymakers and focus the world’s attention on the fact that Germany,
despite its reputation as a leader on addressing climate change, is still
reliant on lignite coal, one of the dirtiest fuels.19
Speaking at COP 23, California Governor Jerry Brown20
acknowledged that the unique urgency of climate change will require
unconventional responses. Although Governor Brown did not address
civil disobedience as a possible response,21 he did compare the threat
of climate challenge to the Second World War, suggesting Congress
was ill equipped to do what was necessary for the United States to take
sufficient action:
coalmines-become-the-focus-for-a-new-wave-of-direct-action
[http://perma.cc/AMS2-KEEC]. Other examples of direct action include the
encampments resisting the Dakota Access Pipeline and shutting down active oil
pipelines in the United States, among others. See Nia Williams, Activists Disrupt Key
Canada-U.S. Oil Pipelines, REUTERS (Oct. 11, 2016) https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-usa-canada-pipelines/activists-disrupt-key-canada-u-s-oil-pipelinesidUSKCN12B26O [http://perma.cc/4S6S-6YEL]; Hilary Beaumont, Pipeline
Protests Will Likely Heat up in 2018, VICE NEWS (Dec. 27, 2017)
https://news.vice.com/en_ca/article/kznzzx/pipelines-protests-will-likely-heat-upin-2018 [http://perma.cc/HNQ7-K4DN].
18. The Associated Press, The Latest: Activists Disrupt German Coal Power
Plant, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 15, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.de/ap-the-latestactivists-disrupt-german-coal-power-plant-2017-11?r=UK&IR=T [http://perma.cc/
L5WA-TEC8].
19. Ende Gelände 2017, Ende Gelände in the Hambach Opencast Mine (Nov. 24,
2017),
https://www.ende-gelaende.org/en/news/ende-gelande-in-the-hambachopencast-mine/ [http://perma.cc/QF3P-FN9C]; see also B.D. Hong and E.R. Slatick,
Carbon Dioxide Emission Factors for Coal, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DOE/EIA0121(49/Q1) 1-8 (Aug. 1994), https://www.eia.gov/coal/production/quarterly/
co2_article/co2.html.
20. Governor Brown headlined the “We Are Still In” faction in Bonn from the
United States, which consisted mostly of Democratic politicians seeking to stay
engaged on the international level as a positive force despite the Trump
Administration’s hostility to Paris. See WE ARE STILL IN, COP23: We Showed the
World that America is Still In, https://www.wearestillin.com/cop23.
21. In fact, Governor Brown has shown some hostility toward disruptive
protesters. See Amy Goodman, CA Gov. Jerry Brown Tells Indigenous Activists
Protesting Fracking He’ll Put Them ‘In the Ground,’ DEMOCRACY NOW, (Nov. 13,
2017)
https://www.democracynow.org/2017/11/13/ca_gov_jerry_brown_tells_
indigenous [http://perma.cc/K3ZH-Z8EV].
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Maybe it was December [‘]41, or maybe it was ‘42;
President Roosevelt said no more private passenger cars.
Over. Now we’re going to make tanks, and we’re going to
make liberty ships and we’re going to make fighter planes.
That was it. Well someday someone is going to have to say
no more fossil fuel cars. Period. We gotta [sic] have clean
cars. But the way we work, we’re not at war, we’re just in a
catastrophic existential threat that will destroy everything,
but we don’t get that yet. . . .22
Critics say policymakers will not “get” the magnitude of the problem
we face until the globe starts experiencing serious, tangible effects
from the changing climate.23 However, by that point substantial effects
could be too late to avoid.24
Professor Karl Coplan clarified this sentiment in discussing the
“cultural cognition challenges for a law-based response to climate
change.”25 Coplan explained that natural cognitive biases pose
substantial barriers to political consensus and strong corresponding
barriers to a legislative response to climate change due to its delayed
effects.26 Legislatures adequately respond to crises that are already
under way,27 but that will not help with the climate crisis. As Coplan
notes,

22. Transcribed from audio recorded by the author.
23. See e.g. Karl S. Coplan, Fossil Fuel Abolition: Legal and Social Issues, 41

COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 233, 245 (2016); U.N. Environment Programme, The Emissions
Gap Report 2017, A UN Environment Synthesis Report (Nov. 2017),
https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/22070/EGR_2017.pdf.
24. Coplan, supra note 23.
25. Coplan, supra note 23, at 244-46.
26. Coplan, supra note 23 (stating “These cognitive biases include: avoidance of
cognitive dissonance, availability heuristic, loss aversion, status quo preferences,
optimism, confirmation bias, inability to process low-probability events, and
framing.”) (citing Karl S. Coplan, Climate Change, Political Truth, and the
Marketplace of Ideas, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 545, 553 (2012)); see also GEORGE
MARSHALL, DON’T EVEN THINK ABOUT IT: WHY OUR BRAINS ARE WIRED TO
IGNORE CLIMATE CHANGE 20 (Bloomsbury 2014).
27. Coplan, supra note 23, at 244 (citing post-Depression regulations, civil rights
legislation, and environmental regulation after disasters).
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[t]his reactive nature of legislative initiative, unfortunately,
suggests that any major legislative response will be deferred
until the effects of climate change reach visible,
unambiguous, crisis proportions. . . . It is hard to say when
such a series of weather catastrophes sufficiently certain to
be climate change-related will occur, but by definition they
will not occur until catastrophic climate change is already
upon us. In such case, it will already be too late. . . .28
Copland concluded that at some point, when the effects of climate
change are too pronounced to ignore, a total ban on fossil fuels will be
the only available response.29
How to overcome these cognitive biases and induce the political
branches of government to timely mitigate climate change is a key
question. Activists are increasingly turning to rights-based litigation
and engaging the judicial branch for an answer. Concerned citizens
unsatisfied with overtures to their elected representatives or
accountability at the ballot box – but who are unprepared to engage in
civil disobedience – see the courts as an opportunity to enhance their
involvement with this struggle.
An Irish court handed down one of the most recent constitutional
rulings of this type, significantly bolstering the credibility of these
rights-based claims. The court found “a personal constitutional right to
an environment that is consistent with the human dignity and wellbeing of citizens at large.”30 This ruling followed the extraordinary

28. Coplan, supra note 23, at 244-245 (citing ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 465, 524, 679 (Aspen Publishers 4th ed. 2010);
Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity is Dead”—Long Live Transformation: Five
Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9 (2010)).
29. Id.
30. Friends of the Irish Environment CLG v. Fingal County Council, et al., [2017]
IEHC 695 ¶ 264 (Nov. 21 2017); see also Karen Savage, Climate Lawsuit Aims to
Enforce Ireland’s Emissions Targets, CLIMATE LIABILITY NEWS (Nov. 7, 2017),
https://www.climateliabilitynews.org/2017/11/07/climate-lawsuit-irelandemissions-paris-agreement/ [http://perma.cc/4USK-NPLK]. Earlier the same month
New Zealand also weighed in, concluding that developments in a variety of
jurisdictions indicate “it may be appropriate for domestic courts to play a role in
Government decision making about climate change policy.” Case No. CIV 2015485-919 [2017] NZHC 733, In re decisions made under the Climate Change
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decisions of Urgenda Foundation v. The Netherlands,31 Juliana v.
United States,32 and Leghari v. Federation of Pakistan33 in the
Netherlands, the U.S. and Pakistan, respectively. Notably, the
Urgenda court concluded that “the State has a duty of care to take
[climate change] mitigation measures,”34 and ordered the Dutch
government to “limit the joint volume of Dutch annual greenhouse gas
emissions, or have them limited . . .” to specified volumes.35 The rise
of rights-based climate litigation is an undeniable trend that is likely to
spread.36
II. CLIMATE LITIGATION IN EUROPE
Climate change related litigation has reached such a frequency that
the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) released a report in
2017 reviewing its reach.37 An online database of climate change
litigation is updated monthly by Columbia Law School and the law
firm Arnold & Porter.38 Citing this database, the UNEP Report states
that “[a]s of March 2017 climate change cases had been filed in 24
countries (25 if one counts the European Union), with 654 cases filed
in the U.S. and over 230 cases filed in all other countries combined.”39
As of May 1, 2018, this figure had increased to 860 cases in the U.S.
and 264 cases in other countries.40 The UNEP report considers
Response Act 2002 and public decisions made in relation to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Judgment ¶ 133 (Nov. 2, 2017).
31. Zaaknummer Urgenda Found. v. Neth., HA ZA 13-1396 The Hague Dist. Ct.
(Chamber for Comm. Affairs June 24, 2015) (under appeal), http://www.urgenda.nl/
documents/VerdictDistrictCourt-UrgendavStaat-24.06.2015.pdf.
32. Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1,224 (D. Or. 2016).
33. Leghari v. Federation of Pakistan, Case No. WP No 25501/2015 (Lahore
High Court, Sept. 14, 2015), https://elaw.org/system/files/pk.leghari.091415_0.pdf.
34. Urgenda at ¶ 4.83.
35. Id. at ¶ 5.1.
36. See U.N. Environment Programme, The Status of Climate Change Litigation:
A Global Review (May 2017), http://wedocs.unep.org/handle/20.500.11822/20767.
37. Id.
38. Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, http://climatecasechart.com/about/.
39. U.N. Environment Programme, supra note 36, at 10.
40. SABIN CENTER FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW, http://climatecasechart.com/
about/; see also U.N. Environment Programme, supra note 36, at 10 (totals go
beyond rights-based constitutional claims, and include all cases “brought before
administrative, judicial and other investigatory bodies that raise issues of law or fact
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litigation an “important tool to push policymakers and market
participants to develop and implement effective means of climate
change mitigation and adaptation. . . .”41
Regarding potential constitutional claims, the UNEP report
indicates that as of 2012 “there [were] at least 92 countries that [had]
granted constitutional status to [the right to a clean or healthy
environment], and a total of 177 countries recognize[d] the right” in
general.42 The report counts Germany among these countries.43 In
2012, “[t]he only remaining holdouts [were] the United States,
Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, China, Oman, Afghanistan,
Kuwait, Brunei Darussalam, Lebanon, Laos, Myanmar, North Korea,
Malaysia, and Cambodia.”44 Since 2012, a Federal District Court in
the United States declared there is “no doubt that the right to a climate
system capable of sustaining human life is fundamental to a free and
ordered society.”45 The bottom line is that “[t]oday [a human right to
a healthy environment] is widely recognized in international law and
endorsed by an overwhelming proportion of countries.”46

regarding the science of climate change and climate change mitigation and
adaptation efforts.”); Paris Agreement, supra note 12 (adopting the definition of
“climate change litigation” first developed by David Markell & J.B. Ruhl, An
Empirical Assessment of Climate Change in the Courts: A New Jurisprudence or
Business as Usual?, 64 FLA. L. REV. 15, 27 (2012)).
41. U.N. Environment Programme, supra note 36, at 8.
42. Id. at 32-33 (citing David R. Boyd, The Constitutional Right to a Healthy
Environment, ENV’T SCI. & POL’Y FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV, July-Aug. 2012,
http://www.environmentmagazine.org/Archives/Back%20Issues/2012/JulyAugust%202012/constitutional-rights-full.html).
43. Boyd, supra note 42, at 1 (cited in U.N. Environment Programme, The Status
of Climate Change Litigation: A Global Review (May 2017) at 33, n.107).
44. Id. (indicating that among these holdouts, “some subnational governments
recognize the right to a healthy environment, including six American states, five
Canadian provinces or territories, and a growing number of cities.”).
45. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1,251 (also noting “In framing the fundamental
right at issue as the right to a climate system capable of sustaining human life, I
intend to strike a balance and to provide some protection against the
constitutionalization of all environmental claims.”). The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals is currently considering a motion by the federal government to issue a writ
of mandamus overturning this ruling.
46. Boyd, supra note 42, at 1.
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A. The Netherlands
Urgenda Foundation v. The State of the Netherlands is perhaps the
most important development for the role of the judiciary in
establishing state duties to protect against hazardous climate change
for two primary reasons.47 First, as the UNEP report noted, the ruling
is
pathbreaking in separation of powers jurisprudence because
it grounded its instruction to the government to tighten
emissions limits on a rights-based analysis rather than
through reference to statutory requirements. Subsequent
petitions and judicial decisions in Austria, Norway,
Switzerland and Sweden . . . have similarly been grounded
at least in part on rights-based theories.48
Second, Urgenda appears to be the first time a court awarded relief
ordering a national government to take affirmative steps to reduce the
joint volume of national GHG emissions within its borders.49 Although
this decision is under appeal, the Dutch government is moving ahead
to implement the order,50 and cited the case as recently as October 19,
2017 as the basis for its new 2020 emissions reduction target.51
The Urgenda case followed the Urgenda Foundation’s unsuccessful
request to the Dutch Prime Minister to “commit and undertake to
47. Urgenda Found. v. Neth., HA ZA 13-1396 The Hague Dist. Ct. (Chamber for
Comm. Affairs June 24, 2015) (under appeal), http://www.urgenda.nl/documents/
VerdictDistrictCourt-UrgendavStaat-24.06.2015.pdf; see also U.N. Environment
Programme, supra note 36, at 15.
48. U.N. Environment Programme, supra note 36.
49. Urgenda at ¶ 5.1 (Ordering “The State to limit the joint volume of Dutch
annual greenhouse gas emissions, or have them limited, so that this volume will have
reduced by at least 25% at the end of 2020 compared to the level of the year 1990,
as claimed by Urgenda, in so far as acting on its own behalf. . . .”).
50. Gov’t of the Netherlands, Cabinet Begins Implementation of Urgenda Ruling
but Will File Appeal, GOV’T OF NETHERLANDS (Sept. 1, 2015),
https://www.government.nl/latest/news/2015/09/01/cabinet-begins-implementation
-of-urgenda-ruling-but-will-file-appeal [http://perma.cc/RCB4-J4UV].
51. Gov’t of the Netherlands, More Sustainable Energy than Expected in 2023,
GOV’T OF NETHERLANDS (Oct. 19, 2015), https://www.government.nl/latest/
news/2017/10/19/more-sustainable-energy-than-expected-in-2023 [http://perma.cc/
6D4A-46HC].
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reduce CO[2] emissions in the Netherlands by 40% by 2020, as
compared to the emissions in 1990.”52 Notably for the discussion
below, this is the precise reduction commitment Germany made, is off
target to achieve,53 and had recently considered abandoning.54
Urgenda Foundation subsequently brought suit, alleging “systemic
responsibility” for the total greenhouse gas emissions in the country
and breach of a duty of care “to ensure a reduction of the emission
level of the Netherlands in order to prevent dangerous climate
change.”55 The Urgenda Foundation relied on, inter alia, the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),56 Article 21 of Dutch
Constitution,57 and other international legal principles and
conventions.58 The Urgenda Foundation’s environmental mission gave
it standing under the Dutch civil code.59
Armed with an abundance of scientific documentation on climate
change, the court found actualized and foreseeable harms and ordered
unambiguous relief.60 In sum, the court concluded “the Dutch
52. Urgenda at ¶ 2.6.
53. See Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and

Nuclear Safety, German Climate Policy, COP23 Fiji, https://www.cop23.de/
en/bmub/german-climate-policy/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2018); Michael Bauchmüller,
Deutschland hinkt seinem Klimaziel hinterher, Süddeutsche Zeitung (Oct. 11, 2017),
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/klimawandel-deutschland-hinkt-seinemklimaziel-hinterher-1.3702329 (Ger.) (citing a leaked internal ministry paper that
predicts Germany’s emissions will be 31.7 to 32.5 percent below 1990 levels).
54. See Niklas Höhne, Germany’s New Government Deal Fails the Paris Climate
Accord Test, CLIMATE HOME NEWS, (Mar. 12, 2018), http://www.climate
changenews.com/2018/03/12/germanys-new-government-deal-fails-paris-climateaccord-test/ [http://perma.cc/9UK3-JJ6R]; Guy Chazan and Tobias Buck, Carbon
Targets on the Table in German Coalition Talks, THE FINANCIAL TIMES, (Jan. 8,
2018) https://www.ft.com/content/d2572cec-f470-11e7-88f7-5465a6ce1a00 [http://
perma.cc/6R4W-65ZC].
55. See Urgenda at ¶ 3.2.
56. Id.
57. Dutch Const. ch. 1, art. 21., https://www.government.nl/binaries/
government/documents/regulations/2012/10/18/the-constitution-of-the-kingdomof-the-netherlands-2008/the-constitution-of-the-kingdom-of-the-netherlands2008.pdf (stating “[i]t shall be the concern of the authorities to keep the country
habitable and to protect and improve the environment”).
58. Urgenda at ¶ 3.2 (citing the U.N. Climate Change Convention and the TFEU).
59. Id. at ¶ 4.6.
60. Id. at ¶¶ 2.8-2.69; 4.64 (noting that the threat of climate change “with
irreversible and serious consequences for man and the environment” is undisputed,
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reduction target is . . . below the standard deemed necessary . . .
meaning that in order to prevent dangerous climate change Annex I
countries61 (including the Netherlands) must reduce greenhouse gas
emissions by 25-40% by 2020 to realise [sic] the 2°C target.”62 This
article does not repeat the scientific evidence of anthropogenic climate
change and its risks, which are conclusive by all credible accounts and
enjoy international acceptance.63 Any reasonable court that considers
the certainty and dangers of climate change would conclude the same.
Turning to the basis for state liability, the court found that the
Netherlands is violating a host of constitutional and international
standards. However, the court also found that the Urgenda Foundation
did not have a cause of action beyond the domestic civil law for which
the court had jurisdiction.64
According to the court, “Article 21 of the Dutch Constitution
imposes a duty of care on the State relating to the livability of the
country and the protection and improvement of the living
environment,”65 but “[t]he manner in which this task should be carried
out is covered by the government’s own discretionary powers.”66 The
court also noted that although the Netherlands is bound by the ECHR,
the UN Climate Change Convention, the Kyoto Protocol, and the “no
harm” principle,67 the binding force of these “only involve[]
and that the parties agree that the State should take precautionary measures for its
citizens).
61. See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, List of Annex I Parties
to the Convention, http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/annex_i/items/
2774.php. “Annex I countries” refers to so-called “developed” countries that bear the
bulk of responsibility for historic GHG emissions, and for taking the lead on
reductions under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto
Protocol.
62. Urgenda at ¶ 4.31.
63. See e.g. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2014
Synthesis Report (2014), http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/syr/; Friedman, supra note
10.
64. See generally Urgenda at ¶ 4.52.
65. Id. at ¶ 4.36.
66. Id.
67. “No harm” is a well-accepted duty under customary international law not to
cause harm to other states. See e.g. Jeremy Suttenberg, Who Pays? The
Consequences of State versus Operator Liability within the Context of
Transboundary Environmental Nuclear Damage, 24 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 201, 228243 (2016).
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obligations towards other states[, not towards Urgenda].”68 Indeed,
while environmental principles can be derived from the decisions of
the European Court of Human Rights,69 the court stated that “Urgenda
itself cannot directly rely on Articles 2 and 8 ECHR.”70 Nevertheless,
the court found that these international instruments and principles still
hold meaning, “namely in the question . . . whether the State has failed
to meet its duty of care toward Urgenda.”71 In other words, all the
provisions and international agreements that the court determined do
not control still define the contours of the State’s “unwritten standard
of care” within the Dutch Civil Code.72 This includes “unlawful
hazardous negligence.”73 “This way, these obligations have a ‘reflex
effect’ in national law.”74
68. Urgenda at ¶ 4.42 (“Urgenda therefore cannot directly rely on [the ‘no harm’]
principle, the convention and the protocol.”). The court also concluded “Urgenda
cannot be designated as a direct or indirect victim, within the meaning of Article 34
ECHR, of a violation of Article 2 and 8 ECHR” because it is a legal person, not a
“natural person” with physical integrity or personal privacy. Id. at ¶ 4.45.
69. Id. at ¶ 4.48 (describing the Manual on Human Rights and the Environment,
published at the recommendation of the Parliamentary Assembly and by order of the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.).
70. Id. at ¶ 4.45.
71. Id. at ¶ 4.52.
72. Book 6, Section 162 of the Dutch Civil Code reads: “1. A person who
commits a tortious act (unlawful act) against another person that can be attributed to
him, must repair the damage that this other person has suffered as a result thereof. 2.
As a tortious act is regarded a violation of someone else’s right (entitlement) and an
act or omission in violation of a duty imposed by law or of what according to
unwritten law has to be regarded as proper social conduct, always as far as there was
no justification for this behavior. 3. A tortious act can be attributed to the tortfeasor
if it results from his fault or from a cause for which he is accountable by virtue of
law or generally accepted principles (common opinion).” Art. 6:162 BW,
http://www.dutchcivillaw.com/civilcodebook 066.htm; see also Urgenda at ¶ 4.43
(citing national-law open standards and concepts, including social propriety,
reasonableness and propriety).
73. Urgenda at ¶ 4.53-54 (the jurisprudence on the doctrine of hazardous
negligence was developed “to detail the requirement of acting with due care towards
society.”).
74. Id. at ¶¶ 4.43 & 4.52; see also Roger Cox, A Climate Change Litigation
Precedent - Urgenda Foundation v. the State of the Netherlands, CENTER FOR INT’L
GOVERNANCE INNOVATION Paper No. 79, 10 (Nov. 4, 2015) (“Hence the court found
that the stipulations included in the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol and the no-harm
principle of international law need to be taken into account when determining the
state’s duty of care in relation to climate change.”).
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Regarding the “right to life” guaranteed by Article 2 of the ECHR,
the court in Urgenda held that it could impose an affirmative
obligation on States to protect from dangerous climate change:
[I]n some situations Article 2 may also impose on public
authorities a duty to take steps to guarantee the right to life
when it is threatened by persons or activities not directly
connected with the State. . . . In the context of the
environment, Article 2 has been applied where certain
activities endangering the environment are so dangerous that
they also endanger human life.75
Unlike in Germany, the Dutch Constitution does not contain an
enumerated right to life, per se.76 Therefore, the Urgenda court relied
in part on jurisprudence of the European Court for Human Rights to
establish the state’s civil duty to protect. Reliance on rulings from the
European Court for Human Rights may not be necessary under the
German constitutional structure, although a German litigant could
certainly do so.77
For relief, the court ordered the Netherlands to “limit the joint
volume of Dutch annual [GHG] emissions, or have them limited, so
that this volume will have reduced by at least 25% at the end of 2020
compared to the level of the year 1990.”78 The court determined that
this is the minimum reduction level that all Annex I countries
75. Urgenda at ¶ 4.49 (The Hague Dist. Ct. Chamber for Comm. Affairs, June
24, 2015) (quoting Manual on Human Rights and the Environment, Council of
Europe (2012)). The Urgenda court also reviewed the Manual’s comments on Article
8 of the ECHR, which guarantees the right to respect for private and family life. See
id. at ¶ 4.50 (“For an issue to arise under Article 8, the environmental factors must
directly and seriously affect private and family life or the home. . . .”).
76. Article 11 of the Dutch Constitution guarantees the “right to inviolability of
his person. . . .” The German Constitution separately guarantees both the right to life
and the inviolability of his person. Compare GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution]
art. 2 (F.R.G.) with STATUUT NED. [Constitution] art. 11.
77. Urgenda at ¶ 4.74. See e.g. BverfG, supra note 6, at ¶¶ 82, 86 (The European
Convention on Human Rights “must be relied on as an interpretation aid in the
interpretation of the fundamental rights and rule-of-law principles of the Basic
Law”).
78. Urgenda at ¶ 5.1. Urgenda had requested an emissions reduction of “40%, or
at least 25%, as of the end of 2020. . . .” Id. at ¶ 4.104.
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combined would need to achieve to keep the atmospheric
concentration of CO2 below a critical level.79 As discussed further
below, Germany’s reductions meet the standard Urgenda imposed on
the Netherlands, showing Urgenda may not be directly analogous to a
potential suit in Germany. Regardless, the scientific and legal
sufficiency of Germany’s climate efforts remains a likely question for
the courts.
Urgenda was groundbreaking in at least two distinct ways: it
incorporated human rights standards into a domestic, civil duty of care
related to climate change and granted relief that requires a national
government to take specific climate action. Friends of the Irish
Environment v. Ireland, et al. is similarly groundbreaking for its
forceful pronouncement of a fundamental, unenumerated right vis-avis climate change mitigation.
B. Ireland
Friends of the Irish Environment v. Ireland, et al. (FIE Airport Case)
was initially brought as a challenge to an airport expansion. The suit
failed to stop the opposed runway, but established a constitutional
“right to an environment that is consistent with the human dignity and
well-being of citizens at large” in Ireland.80 Still pending in the Irish
High Court is a separate case brought by FIE to challenge the adequacy
of the Irish government’s actions to avert dangerous climate change
(hereafter “FIE Climate Case”).81 The litigants hope the FIE Climate

79. See id. at ¶¶ 4.29 & 4.31 (relying on, inter alia, conclusions of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: Fourth
Assessment Report (2007), http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar4/index.shtml).
80. Friends of the Irish Environment CLG v. Fingal County Council, et al., [2017]
IEHC 695 ¶ 264 (Nov. 21, 2017).
81. Friends of the Irish Environment CLG v. Government of Ireland, Case No.
2017/793 JR. (Irish High Court, filed Oct. 19, 2017). See also Press Release, Irish
Government Taken to Court in Landmark Climate Case, FRIENDS OF THE IRISH
ENV’T, Oct. 23, 2017, http://www.friendsoftheirishenvironment.org/climatecase/17459-irish-government-taken-to-court-in-landmark-climate-case
[http://
perma.cc/EY3X-GFFM]; Press Release, Landmark Climate Case against the Irish
State Pushed Back to February, FRIENDS OF THE IRISH ENV’T, Feb. 1, 2018,
http://www.friendsoftheirishenvironment.org/climate-case/17492-landmarkclimate-case-against-the-irish-state-pushed-back-to-february
[http://perma.cc/
96NK-8TR7].
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Case will follow the trail blazed by Urgenda and should be bolstered
by the constitutional right recognized in the Airport Case.82
The FIE Airport Case is remarkable for its surprising significance.
By all indications, FIE’s climate arguments were secondary to other
arguments to stop the airport expansion. FIE’s primary arguments
included those related to EU Directives and an Irish Planning and
Development Act, among others.83 In addition, FIE also claimed that
a new runway would increase GHG emissions and quicken climate
change. Although FIE’s climate claim was not ultimately
determinative of the runway question, the court’s declaration
nevertheless provided a huge victory for environmental activists.
FIE persuaded the court that there is scientific,
theological/philosophical, and jurisprudential consensus concerning
environmental rights. First, the court accepted “a scientific consensus
concerning the centrality of (maintaining) the environment to continue
human existence.”84 The court then extended this to climate change,
finding “no doubt” that it threatens the environment on which
continuing human existence relies.85 Second, the court acknowledged
the theological/philosophical consensus on environmental matters, but
did not rely on it for its legal analysis.
What is perhaps most striking . . . [is] the commonality of
views that appears to be shared by all of the major religions
on matters environmental, as evidenced by the well-known
Assisi Declarations of September 1986 in which
distinguished leaders and personages from the Buddhist,
Christian, Hindu, Islamic and Judaic faiths individually
82. See Press Release, Irish Government to Appear in Court in Landmark Climate
Case, FRIENDS OF THE IRISH ENV’T, Dec. 10, 2017, http://www.friendsof
theirishenvironment.org/press-releases/17473-irish-government-to-appear-in-courtin-landmark-climate-case [http://perma.cc/E4N8-RKGW] (Urgenda “proved that all
governments have a legal duty to protect their citizens against climate change by
doing their part to lower emissions”); see also id. (FIE is “greatly encouraged by the
recent declaration by the High Court that citizens have a constitutional right to an
environment that is consistent with human dignity and the well-being of citizens at
large”).
83. See generally Friends of the Irish Environment CLG v. Fingal County
Council.
84. Id. at ¶ 242.
85. See id. at ¶ 244 (citing IPCC documentation and expert opinions).
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issued a series of declarations which point to humanity’s
common destiny as the stewards and trustees of our shared
natural environment. Notable too is secular environmental
philosophy, whether as fashioned by the Deep Ecology
Movement or in its more recent post-naturalistic form. . . .86
Although the court made clear that it limited its analysis “solely to
accepted legal reasoning,”87 this dicta provides normative credibility
to the court’s subsequent legal ruling. No doubt, the vast majority of
individuals would identify with one of the groups referenced. Finally,
the court found legal support in the Irish constitution and the ECHR,
rejecting the state’s arguments. In general, the court showed minimal
concern with recognizing a previously unrecognized right, which
courts have a willingness to do so long as the analysis is sound.88 The
court noted “the certainties of yesterday can very quickly be overtaken
by a fresh and very different comprehension of existence.”89
Developments over the past twenty years have led to a “consensus as
to the importance of the preservation of the environment,” making the
time ripe for judicial recognition of the right.90 The court found it
“difficult to see how the dignity and freedom of individuals is being
assured if the natural environment on which their respective well-being
is concerned is being progressively diminished.”91
The court similarly dismissed concerns about the environmental
right being ill-defined.92 Despite many open questions about the scope
of this right,
the court does not accept that all such issues require
necessarily to be pre-identified (if they can all be identified)
and also resolved before the contended-for existing
constitutional right can be recognized as existing. Other
constitutional rights, such as freedom of speech, and even
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at ¶ 242.
Id.
See id. at ¶ 243 (citing McGee v. Attorney General [1974] IR 284 (Ir.)).
Friends of the Irish Environment CLG v. Fingal County Council, et al., [2017]
IEHC 695 (Nov. 21, 2017).
90. Id. at ¶ 246 (quoting Applicant).
91. Id.
92. See id. at ¶ 254.
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recognized but unenumerated constitutional rights, such as
the right to bodily integrity, present similar complications,
with their limits only capable of being defined, demarcated
and better understood over time, and yet they are recognised
[sic] to exist.93
From the court’s perspective, there were many fundamental rights
which “so-called ‘ordinary’ citizens, if approached today, would be
astonished to learn had ever been the subject of legal controversy or
dispute (much the court suspects, as the right contended for . . . is now,
or will in the future, be seen).”94 And while caution is warranted, it is
the role of the judiciary to identify unenumerated rights.95
Enforceability was no barrier either. “Once concretised [sic] into
specific duties and obligations, its enforcement is entirely
practicable.”96 Specifics will be “defined and demarcated” over time.97
“[T]o start down that path of definition and demarcation, one first has
to recognise [sic] that there is a personal constitutional right to an
environment that is consistent with the human dignity and well-being
of citizens at large and upon which those duties and responsibilities
will be constructed.”98 The court recognized the unenumerated right
under the Irish Constitution with reference to the right to life (Article
40.3), right to work (Articles 50 and/or 45), right to private property
(Article 43), and the European Convention on Human Rights.99
Indeed, the court concluded that “[a] right to an environment that is
consistent with the human dignity and well-being of citizens at large
93. Id.
94. Id. at ¶ 256.
95. See Friends of the Irish Environment CLG v. Fingal County Council, et al.,

[2017] IEHC 695 ¶ 257 (Nov. 21, 2017) (“[I]f the rule of law, in the form
contemplated and tolerated by the people, is not to descend to the arbitrary rule of
whoever comprises the current representative majority from time to time, then the
only agency available to put rights, including unenumerated constitutional rights,
between the claims of the executive or legislative and those of so-called ‘ordinary’
people, is the judicial branch of the tripartite government that the people have
established directly.”).
96. Id. at ¶ 264.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at ¶¶ 263 (also citing arts. 40.3.2 & 44.2.6) & 269 (citing Taskin and Ors
v. Turkey (ECHR App. No. 46117/99)).
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is an essential condition for the fulfillment of all human rights. It is an
indispensable existential right that is enjoyed universally.”100
Courts in the Netherlands, Ireland and other states have signaled to
the world that judges are open to finding rights-based state-duties to
combat climate-change. Seeing the success of the litigants in those
jurisdictions, German environmentalists will likely find the prospect
of a similar complaint in the German Constitutional Court too enticing
to resist.
III. GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
Germany stands among the more aggressive industrialized nations
at reducing its GHG emissions. The government has set relatively
ambitious reduction targets compared to other nations, but Germany is
not expected to meet those targets and recently considered abandoning
them.101 Measured against the actions of other countries, Germany
would not be a convincing setting for a rights-based climate change
lawsuit. However, measuring Germany’s national actions against its
own prior targets, or against scientific prescriptions, makes the forum
more favorable. A healthy planet would face long, perhaps
insurmountable, odds if every nation misses their targets as Germany
did. Regardless of the wisdom of a constitutional complaint under the
Grundgesetz, litigation is likely in light of global trends and the legal
regime in Germany that makes it possible.
First, Germany has a relatively liberal access to justice regime for
constitutional complaints, which “may be filed by any person alleging
that one of his basic rights or one of his rights under [certain articles]
has been infringed by public authority.”102 The complaint must merely
“specify the right which has allegedly been violated, as well as the act
or omission of the organ or authority by which the complainant claims
his or her rights have been violated.”103 Under the Grundgesetz, the
Constitutional Court “shall rule” on the interpretation of the Basic Law
concerning “the extent of the rights and duties of a supreme federal

100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at ¶ 264.
See Höhne, supra note 5.
G.G. art. 93(1)(4a); see also BVerfGG § 90(1).
BVerfGG § 92 (emphasis added).
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body. . . .”104 And under the Richterliche Hinweispflicht principle,
judges help facilitate the right to be heard105 by providing opportunities
for parties to correct matters that could be grounds for dismissal—
increasing the probability of reaching the merits of the claims.106
Second, the German principle of Schutzpflich, or duty to protect,
bolsters the merit of a rights-based climate complaint and the
availability of relief. As one scholar explained, Schutzpflich “means
that the individual whose constitutionally protected interests may be
infringed upon by third parties has a claim against the state if the
existing laws do not protect him or her sufficiently.”107 Thus, the
Constitutional Court could order the legislature to take action if its
failure to act violates a right.108 Specifically, this means that “the
legislature loses the power to remain inactive vis-a-vis a manifest
danger for a fundamental right. . . . The power lost by the legislature is
gained by the Constitutional Court.”109 This regime is markedly
different from the United States and bolsters the justiciability of a
climate complaint.110

104. G.G. art. 93(1)(1). See also BVerfGG § 67 (“The Federal Constitutional
Court shall declare in its decision whether the respondent’s contested act or omission
violates a provision of the Basic Law. The provision is to be specified. In the
operative part of the decision the Federal Constitutional Court may at the same time
decide on a point of law which is relevant for interpreting the provision of the Basic
Law on which the declaration pursuant to the first sentence depends.”).
105. G.G. art. 103.1.
106. See Robert W. Emerson, Judges as Guardian Angels: The German Practice
of Hints and Feedback, 48 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 707 (2015).
107. GEORG NOLTE, EUROPEAN AND US CONSTITUTIONALISM (2005), at 128.
108. Id.
109. Id. See also DONALD P. KOMMERS & RUSSELL A. MILLER, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 58 (3rd
ed. 2012) (“A basic [constitutional] right is a negative right against the state, but this
right also represents a value, and as a value it imposes a positive obligation on the
state to ensure that it becomes an integral part of the general legal order.” (citing
Peter Quint, Free Speech and Private Law in German Constitutional Theory, 48 MD.
L. REV. 247, 261 (1989))).
110. Compare with Deshaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Services, 489 U.S.
189 (1989) (no obligation of state to act to protect against private individuals, in this
case to protect a regularly beaten boy from his father, despite repeated alerts to the
county) (discussed in GEORG NOLTE ED., EUROPEAN AND US CONSTITUTIONALISM
153 (Council of Eur. Pub. 2005); see also KOMMERS &MILLER, supra note 109, at
60.
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Finally, although in Germany there is “no fundamental right which
explicitly guarantees any particular condition of the environment,”111
scholars recognize the possibility that a court could infer such a right.
One could infer the right from “the intentions of the constitutional
legislature . . . starting with the hypothesis that these intentions have
not always been made clear or, in other words, that it is permissible to
take account of changed views about society and thereby promote
consistent further development of the existing written provisions.”112
As discussed above, the Irish High Court had no problem adopting this
method of interpretation.113 And there is precedent for the German
Constitutional Court to interpret the Basic Law in this way.114 The
inference could happen either through the examination of individual
basic rights or deriving the interpretation from the Basic Law as a
whole.115 As one scholar articulated, “[t]he argument has been put
forward that the individual positive guarantees in the Basic Law are
merely particular manifestations of a comprehensive environmental
basic right which stands behind these individual manifestations, as it
were, and which these individual guarantees enable us to infer.”116
A. Grundgesetz Article 20a
Any analysis of an environmental constitutional right in Germany
should begin with Article 20a, a manifestly appealing, albeit rather
toothless authority for a state-duty to mitigate climate change. Article
20a of the Grundgesetz states:

111. P. Kunig, German Constitutional Law and the Environment, 8 ADEL. L. REV.
318, 324 (1983) (cited with approval by KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 109, at ch.
1, n.41).
112. Id. at 324.
113. See Friends of the Irish Environment CLG v. Fingal County Council, et al.,
[2017] IEHC 695 ¶¶ 243-246 (Nov. 21, 2017); see also Juliana v. US, 217 F. Supp.
3d 1,224, 1,249 (“The genius of the Constitution is that its text allows ‘future
generations [to] protect . . . the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its
meaning.’” (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015))).
114. See e.g. P. Kunig, supra note 111, at 324 (citing inference of the “rule of law”
principle, discussed in K Stern, Das Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
vol. 1 § 20 IV (1977)).
115. Id. at 324, 330.
116. Id. at 330.
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[m]indful also of its responsibility toward future
generations, the state shall protect the natural foundations of
life and animals by legislation and, in accordance with the
law and justice, by executive and judicial action, all within
the framework of the constitutional order.117
Climate change, with its delayed and profound adverse impacts,
epitomizes a threat to future generations. At first glance, Article 20a
appears to explicitly impose a responsibility on the state to protect the
natural environment through “judicial action,” implying a cause of
action.118 However, as revealed below, the legislative record shows
that preclusion of an individual right was a priority for the majority
that passed Article 20a.119 The framers simply did not want to
empower citizens to bring constitutional complaints under Article 20a.
But what, if anything, does Article 20a actually prescribe with its
striking language? A review of the competing proposals and legislative
debate helps answer this question.
1. Legislative History
The constitutional amendment adding Article 20a passed in 1994
after two decades of attempts.120 To be sure, climate change was not at
the forefront of the political psyche when this debate started, but by
1987 at least one legislator already cited the importance of a “globally

117.
118.
119.
120.

GRUNDGESETZ, [GG] [BASIC LAW], art. 20a.
Id.
See infra Section III.A.1.
See DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, PLENARPROTOKOLL 12/238 (June 30, 1994)
(Ger.), http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/12/12238.pdf; see also DEUTSCHER
BUNDESTAG, PLENARPROTOKOLL 11/8 378 (Apr. 2, 1987) (Ger.),
http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/11/11008.pdf#P.387 (statement of Dr. Hauff)
(debating Drucksache 11/10) (“For several years, the SPD parliamentary group has
called for the simple and clear sentence to be included in our constitution . . . this
problem was first addressed in a government document - the Federal Environment
Agency’s Environmental Report - in 1974.” (author’s translation)). A subsequent
amendment added “and animals” to Article 20a in 2002. See Kate Nattrass, “Und
Die Tiere” Constitutional Protection for Germany’s Animals, 10 ANIMAL L. 283
(2004).
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stable climate” to future generations as a basis for adding an
environmental amendment through Article 20a.121
A significant point of disagreement among the political factions
considering Article 20a was whether an environmental amendment
should provide a “fundamental right,” or merely a “state goal”
(Staatziel), with legislators opining on the functional differences
between the two. In the 1980s, the Social Democrats (SPD) advocated
for Article 20a to be a simple sentence: “The natural foundations of
life are under the special protection of the state.”122 The SPD saw this
as a “state goal” and argued it would enshrine nature protection as “a
commitment for all state action.”123 From the SPD’s perspective, such
a state goal would permit the Constitutional Court to intervene “only
in a gross neglect or even disregard of the protection of the
environment.”124 The SPD “oppose[d] the inclusion of a fundamental
right to environmental protection in our Constitution” precisely
because it could shift environmental decisions from the legislature to
the courts.125 Debate did not clarify how the SPD believed the
Constitutional Court would have jurisdiction where environmental
protection is “grossly disregarded,” but in SPD’s view the court would
have a role.126 To them, “[s]tate goals [such as this proposal] are
constitutional norms with legally binding effect, which also give the
Constitutional Court more control over public action and, to a greater
extent in the future, also against public neglect.”127

121. See e.g. DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, PLENARPROTOKOLL 11/8 379 (Apr. 2,
1987) (Ger.), http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/11/11008.pdf#P.387 (statements of
Dr. Hauff) (also referencing water quality degradation, smog, solid waste,
Chernobyl, and chemical accidents on the Rhine, among other environmental
problems) (author’s translation).
122. See DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, DRUCKSACHE 11/10, (Feb. 18, 1987) (Ger.),
http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/11/000/1100010.pdf
(author’s
translation)
(original German: “Die natürlichen Lebensgrundlagen stehen unter dem besonderen
Schutz des Staates.”); DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, PLENARPROTOKOLL 11/8 378 (Apr.
2, 1987) (Ger.) (statements of Dr. Hauff) (debating Drucksache 11/10).
123. DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, PLENARPROTOKOLL 11/8 378 (Apr. 2, 1987) (Ger.),
http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/11/11008.pdf#P.387 (statements of Dr. Hauff)
(debating Drucksache 11/10) (author’s translation).
124. Id. at 379 (statements of Dr. Hauff) (author’s translation).
125. Id. (statements of Dr. Hauff) (author’s translation).
126. Id. (author’s translation).
127. Id. at 380 (statements of Dr. Hauff) (author’s translation).
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The Free Democrats (FDP), a junior coalition partner from 1969 to
1998 in federal governments headed by both the SPD and Christian
Democrats (CDU)128 at various times, largely agreed with SPD’s
position.129 To the FDP, “[a] state goal is a duty to act for the
legislature, a normative guideline.”130 With a state goal, environmental
protection would receive greater weight in the interpretation of the law
and thus “bind all three branches of government,” but without a private
cause of action.131
In 1987, a CDU representative expressed skepticism that any
constitutional amendment was necessary at all, but the party ultimately
agreed to add nature protection as a state goal:
No one in this House doubts that the protection and care of
natural resources is an essential task of the state. It is just as
natural as the duty of the state to provide for internal peace.
Both tasks of the state are not explicitly mentioned in our
constitution. This has never prevented this coalition from
acting in both fields and, in particular, enforcing a host of
concrete measures against the further burden on the
environment. . . . Nevertheless, ladies and gentlemen, the
coalition has decided to include environmental protection as
a state goal in the Basic Law. It should not be concealed that
this decision has been thoroughly controversial in the
coalition. . . .132
The CDU representative, Horst Eylmann, also suggested that adding
an enumerated state goal would be redundant because of rights
guaranteed by other constitutional provisions. Eylmann stated “one
can assert that the state objective of environmental protection results
indirectly from some norms of the Basic Law. For example, a public
duty to protect the citizens from environmental damage and
environmental hazards can be derived from the right to life and
128. For purposes of this article, “Christian Democrats” refer to both the Christian
Democratic Union, and its sister party in Bavaria, the Christian Social Union.
129. See id. at 383 (statements of Baum). The FDP had supported the inclusion of
environmental protection in the Basic Law since 1971.
130. Id. (statements of Baum) (author’s translation).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 380-81 (statements of Eylmann) (author’s translation).
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physical integrity.”133 Although Eylmann meant to undermine the
necessity of the amendment in the first place, his statement could also
be interpreted as unintentionally supporting an unenumerated right to
a healthy environment derived from Article 2 Grundgesetz, and other
fundamental rights.
As for the Green Party, it believed “the incorporation of
environmental protection as a state objective in the Basic Law is not
enough. . . . The protection of the environment must be a fundamental
right. . . .”134 The Green Party’s concern was that “[t]he SPD’s bill
offer[ed] no guarantee that the individual can really defend himself in
reference to the Basic Law.”135 Like the CDU member, the Green
representative also cited Article 2’s “right to life,” arguing Article 2
already implicates environmental rights, but requires clarification with
a new, enumerated fundamental right. The Green Party representative
stated:
[t]he Basic Law and Human Rights . . . also include a
fundamental right to an intact environment, Mr. Eylmann. I
fully agree with you. However, the SPD writes that the
current constitutional law does not guarantee a satisfactory
protection of natural resources. Yes, what does Article 2(2)
sentence 1 say? Everyone has the right to life and [physical]
integrity. . . . This includes the right to clean air, healthy
water, non-toxic foods, etc. How else should the physical
integrity be guaranteed, ladies and gentlemen?136
The Green Party subsequently proposed additions to Articles 2 and
20 G.G., in lieu of a new Article 20a.137 In so doing, the Greens
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 381.
Id. at 382 (statements of Garbe) (author’s translation).
Id.
Id.
DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, DRUCKSACHE 11/633, Gesetzentwurf der Fraktion
Die Grünen (Aug. 4, 1987) (Ger.), http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/11/006/
1100663.pdf. The Greens’ proposal also included amendments to Articles 14 and 28.
The proposal included the following additions (shown in italics) (author’s
translation):
Article 2(2): Every person shall have the right to life and physical integrity, the
preservation of its natural resources and protection against significant damage to
its natural environment.
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explained that “[t]hose who want to move forward in terms of
environmental policy must give people what they rightfully demand,
namely more freedom of action and concrete rights. They must be able
to assert the destruction of natural resources as a violation of their
personal rights in court.”138 The Bundestag, the German federal
parliament, rejected this proposal in September 1990.139 Had the Green
Party succeeded, a constitutional claim on climate change mitigation
would be much more straightforward.
In the end, the government adopted compromise language for a
“state goal,” as it is now enshrined. The Federal Government’s official
view of the passed amendment once again clarified that it created no
individual right or private cause of action, while still envisioning some
role for the judiciary.140
2. Application of Grundgesetz Article 20a
Even if Article 20a does not provide an individual right or cause of
action, a rights-based constitutional complaint is still likely to rely on
and cite it extensively. The state goal is certainly relevant, although the
German Constitutional Court has devoted little time to fleshing out the
implications of Article 20a. The Constitutional Court suggested
Article 20a “may require taking measures for the protection against
threats,” including from climate change, but did not indicate how that
requirement would be enforced and did not elaborate what constitutes
a threat.141 In an earlier case, the Court had shown deference to the

Article 20(1): The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal
state. The natural environment is the basis of human life and for its own sake is under
the special protection of the state. In the case of conflicts between ecological
resilience and economic needs, priority must be given to environmental issues if
otherwise there is a significant threat of deterioration of the natural environment.
138. DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, PLENARPROTOKOLL 11/277, 17,966 (Sept. 21,
1990) (Ger.), http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/11/11227.pdf#P.17969 (statement of
Häfner) (author’s translation).
139. Id. at 17,974.
140. See DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, DRUCKSACHE 12/7109, 7-9 (Mar. 17, 1994)
(Ger.) (“the wording does not contain any subjective and thus enforceable claims. . . .
At the same time, the text outlines the co-responsibility of the jurisprudence and the
administration for the protection of natural resources.” (author’s translation)).
141. In re Aviation Tax Act, BVerfG, Judgment of the First Senate, 1BvF 3/11 ¶
47 (Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.bverfg.de/e/fs20141105_1bvf000311en.html.
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government’s assessment of the relative impacts of lignite mining and
power generation that could conflict with Article 20a.142
In most instances, the court cites Article 20a to justify a state action
that is in tension with another constitutional right. For example, in a
case reviewing regulations of genetically modified organisms (GMO),
the court cited Article 20a (among other constitutional provisions) to
justify the state’s infringement on otherwise protected academic
freedoms.143 In another case, the court cited Article 20a to explain and
justify the state’s decision to expedite the phase-out of nuclear
energy.144 The court generally handles Article 20’s social state
principle145 in a similar manner.146
In the climate change context, Article 20a would add value to a
rights-based climate complaint for at least two reasons. First, Article
20a may provide interpretive guidance to the Constitutional Court to
prioritize stronger environmental protection when interpreting other
constitutional or statutory language pertinent to the complaint. As a

142. Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland Landesverband NordrhienWestfalen e.V. v. Federal Administrative Court, BVerfG,, Judgment Spruchkoerper,
1 BvR 3139/08, ¶ 298 (Dec. 17, 2013) (“The assessment of the serious impact on
people and the environment that undisputedly follows from mining of lignite and its
use for power generation is subject to the execute and legislative branches’ political
prerogative of assessment, also with regard to the constitutional values of Art. 14 §
1 & Art. 20a GG.”).
143. In re Act on the Regulation of Genetic Engineering, BVerfG, Judgment of
the First Senate, 1 BvF 2/05 ¶ 23 (Nov. 24, 2010), http://www.bverfg.de/e/
fs20101124_1bvf000205en.html.
144. In re Thirteenth Act Amending the Atomic Energy Act, BVerfG, Judgment
of the First Senate, 1 BvR 2821/11 ¶ 283 (Dec. 6, 2016), http://www.bverfg.de/e/
rs20161206_1bvr282111en.html. In the Nuclear case, the Court seemed to equate
the right to life at Article 2(2) G.G. and Article. 20a G.G: “[T]here are concerns
relating to the fundamentally high-value protected interests of the life and health of
the people (G.G. art. 2 § 2 sentence 1) and the natural foundations of life (G.G. art.
20a), which the acceleration of the nuclear phase-out contributes to.” Id. at ¶ 366. As
discussed above, Article 2(2) provides a fundamental right, while Article 20a
established a state goal - distinct classifications of different legal weight.
145. G.G art. 20 provides certain “constitutional principles,” more akin to state
goals than fundamental rights, such as the social state principle, which provides
“[t]he Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal state.” G.G.
art. 20 § 1.
146. See Inga Markovits, Constitution Making After National Catastrophes:
Germany in 1949 and 1990, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1,307, 1,340 (2008).
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Bundestag member stated during debate regarding the state goal in
Article 20a:
[e]nvironmental protection receives a higher weight in the
interpretation of the laws, in the specification of indefinite
legal concepts, in the exercise of discretion . . . [and] is
important for the judicial application of law. . . .147
In a case of first impression, the Court’s analysis of an inferred state
duty – either derived from one or more specific fundamental rights, or
from the Grundgesetz as a whole – will inevitably involve passages
subject to competing interpretations. Article 20a suggests that
ambiguities should be resolved in favor of increased environmental
protection, which could tilt the balance of any ruling. At a minimum,
since Article 20a’s state goal affects the overall constitutional order, it
could play a significant role in the Court’s analysis of possible rights
derived from the Basic Law as a whole.148
Second, even though there are substantial jurisdictional barriers to
the Court adjudicating a substantive Article 20a claim alone, other
accompanying fundamental rights claims under Articles 1-19 (as
discussed below) could bootstrap in an Article 20a claim in its own
right.
Under
Article
93(1)(4a)
G.G.
and
Bundesverfassungsgerichtgesetz (“Federal Constitutional Court Act,”
or “BverfGG”) section 90(1), the Constitutional Court has jurisdiction
over alleged state violations of fundamental rights and some other
provisions, not including Article 20a.149 However, “[o]nce a complaint
is properly admitted the [C]ourt might perhaps be obliged by virtue of
its office to consider the compatibility of the law at issue with other
147. DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, PLENARPROTOKOLL 11/8, 383 (Apr. 2, 1987)
(Ger.) (statements of Baum) (author’s translation).
148. See DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, PLENARPROTOKOLL 12/238, 20,969 (June 30,
1994) (Ger.) (statement of Finance Minister Dr. Theodor Waigel),
http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/12/12238.pdf;
DEUTSCHER
BUNDESTAG,
PLENARPROTOKOLL 11/227, 17,969-70 (Sept. 21, 1990) (Ger.) (statement of Justice
Minister Engelhard), http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/11/11227.pdf#P.17969; P.
Kunig, supra note 111, at 325 & 330.
149. See also Michael Singer, The Constitutional Court of the German Federal
Republic: Jurisdiction over Individual Complaints, 31 INT’L COMP. L. Q. 331, 339
(1982).
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constitutional provisions.”150 This should also apply to alleged
unconstitutional acts or omissions, including those related to climate
change mitigation.151 Thus, with jurisdiction over a complaint
regarding the state’s violation of Article 2 G.G., for example, the
Constitutional Court would be free to rule on a related alleged violation
of the state’s “responsibility toward future generations” under Article
20a.152 Put another way, “[a] weak claim which, although formally
admissible, might if brought alone be summarily dismissed may still
be adequate to support a substantially stronger claim which, if brought
alone, would be inadmissible.”153 This is not to say that the
jurisdictional limitations of BVerfGG section 90(1) have no meaning,
rather the Court enjoys discretion to consider otherwise noncognizable claims that accompany claims for which its jurisdiction is
enumerated. Perhaps in this manner, a rights-based climate suit will
prompt the Constitutional Court to elucidate what, if any, duties arise
from the mandates of Article 20a. As one scholar wrote, “Article 20a
does not entitle individuals to sue the state . . . [but] if the legislature
drags its feet in passing needed environmental legislation, the
Constitutional Court would probably find ways to remind it of its
duty.”154
Despite its powerful language directing the state to “protect the
natural foundations of life” as a “responsibility toward future
generations,” a constitutional climate change complaint will need
more than just Article 20a. As enacted, Article 20a was never intended
to provide a cognizable fundamental right. On the other hand, the same
is true for Article 21 of the Dutch Constitution, which similarly
provides “[i]t shall be the concern of the authorities to keep the country
habitable and to protect and improve the environment.” Despite the
wide latitude given to the Dutch legislature to implement this article,
the Urgenda court held it “imposes a duty of care on the State relating
to the livability of the country and the protection and improvement of

150. Id. at 341(quoting BVerfGE 6,376 [385]) (cited with approval by Kommers
and Miller at ch. 1, n.41).
151. See e.g. BVerfGG § 92.
152. G.G. art. 20a.
153. Singer, supra note 149, at 341.
154. Markovits, supra note 146, at 1341-42.
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the living environment,”155 and found a way to hold the government
liable for its failure to protect.156 In Germany, once a litigant alleges
the violation of a fundamental right and thereby confers jurisdiction on
the constitutional complaint, the German Constitutional Court could
find a similar “duty of care on the State,” derived from G.G. Article
20a.
B. Fundamental Rights
Unlike with constitutional state goals, there is no question that under
German law “persons” have a cause of action against the state for
violations of fundamental rights, including a failure to protect.157 The
far reaching effects of unmitigated climate change potentially impact
a host of fundamental rights. This section focuses on Grundgesetz
Articles 2, 3 and 14, but creative arguments are also available for
claims under less obvious provisions. While a complaint could, for
example, argue that heat waves of increased intensity and frequency
threaten farmers’ families (Article 6) and livelihood (Article 12), these
claims are probably more tenuous.158 In a constitutional complaint, a

155. Urgenda Found. v. Neth., HA ZA 13-1396 The Hague Dist. Ct. ¶ 4.36
(Chamber for Comm. Affairs June 24, 2015) (under appeal), http://www.urgenda.nl/
documents/VerdictDistrictCourt-UrgendavStaat-24.06.2015.pdf.
156. See Urgenda at ¶ 4.36 (The Hague Dist. Ct. Chamber for Comm. Affairs,
June 24, 2015); Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz v. Schweizerische
Bundeskanzlei, Complaint (Federal Administrative Court, Nov. 25, 2016) translated
in
http://klimaseniorinnen.ch/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/request_KlimaSenior
innen.pdf (arguing “Although these provisions contain neither specific instructions
nor legislative mandates or constitutional rights, they are still a ‘legally binding
action guideline’ and have ‘programmatic significance.’” (internal citations
omitted)). In Switzerland, the constitution also provides “aims,” including
“sustainable development,” and “the long term preservation of natural resources. . .
.” Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation, arts. 2(2) and 2(4), translated in
https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/19995395/201709240000/
101.pdf.
157. G.G. art. 93(1)(4a); BVerfGG § 90(1).
158. See e.g., Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1,242 (One plaintiff “alleges recordsetting temperatures harm the health of the hazelnut orchard on his family farm, an
important source of both revenue and food for his and his family”); id. at 1,250
(“[Plaintiffs] assert the government has caused pollution and climate change on a
catastrophic level, and that if the government’s actions continue unchecked, they will
permanently and irreversibly damage plaintiffs’ property, their economic
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German litigant is more likely to focus on the rights to life (Article 2),
equal protection (Article 3), and property (Article 14).
Each of these rights should be read in the context of and supported
by the inviolability of human dignity, enumerated at Article 1 G.G.159
In the words of scholars Donald Kommers and Russell Miller, the
German Bill of Rights “are bound together in an organic unity” with
Article 1, which informs “the substance and spirit of the entire
[constitution].”160 Article 1’s inseparability is particularly true for
Articles 2 and 3.161 Therefore, a rights-based climate complaint is sure
to emphasize that under Article 1 G.G., the state has a duty to protect
human dignity, which is threatened by the impacts of climate change.
As Kunig argued, Article 1’s concomitant right “to lead a life which is
essentially self-determined . . . is obviously placed in jeopardy if the
individual is deprived of possibilities of development by poor
environmental conditions which affect his physical and emotional
well-being.” 162 In fact, the court in FIE v. Ireland framed the very right
it recognized as “[a] right to an environment that is consistent with the
human dignity and well-being of citizens at large.”163 Beginning to
elucidate that right in dictum, the Irish High Court asserted “[i]t is
difficult to see how the dignity and freedom of individuals is being
assured if the natural environment on which their respective well-being

livelihood . . . their health, and ultimately their (and their children’s) ability to live
long, healthy lives.”).
159. See KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 109, at 355.
160. Id. (citing Peter Haberle, “Die Menschenwürde als Grundlage der staatlichen
Gemeinschaft,” in HANDBUCH DES STAATSRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK
DEUTSCHLAND (8 vols.), eds. Josef Insenee & Paul Kirchhof 1:815-61 (Heidelberg:
C.G. Müller Juristischer Verlag, 1987) (additional citation omitted)).
161. Id.; see also BERTRAND MATHIEU, THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN EUROPEAN
CONSTITUTIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CASE-LAW 12 (2006) (“[t]he right to life, like
other rights and perhaps more so than any other right, follows directly from the
principle of human dignity”).
162. P. Kunig, supra note 111, at 330 (further stating, “it has been argued that Art.
1 (1) of the Basic Law points to an (unwritten) defensive right against conduct which
damages
the
environment.”)
(citing
CHR
SENING,
BEDROHTE
ERHOLUNGSLANDSCHAFT. ÜBERLEGUNGEN ZU IHREM RECHTLICHEN Schutz 166
(1977); A ROSSNAGEL, GRUNDRECHTE UND KERNKRAFTWERK 42 (1979)).
163. See Friends of the Irish Environment CLG v. Fingal County Council, et al.,
[2017] IEHC 695 ¶ 264 (Nov. 21 2017) (calling it “an essential condition for the
fulfilment of all human rights”).
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is concerned is being progressively diminished.”164 A German litigant
is sure to echo this sentiment in the context of climate change. As “a
rather flexible concept,”165 the complaint could frame Article 1’s
human dignity guarantee in manners that elevate each of the other
fundamental rights.
1. Right to Life
The right to life in Article 2(2) of the Grundgesetz is the most likely
enumerated fundamental right on which a climate change
constitutional complaint could rest.166 Article 2 G.G. reads:
(1) Every person shall have the right to free development of
his personality insofar as he does not violate the rights of
others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral
law.
(2) Every person shall have the right to life and physical
integrity. Freedom of the person shall be inviolable. These
rights may be interfered with only pursuant to law.167
Urgenda and several opinions of the European Court of Justice have
interpreted a similar “right to life” in ECHR Article 2 to encompass
protection from various foreseeable environmental harms and natural
disasters.168 Although technically subordinate to the Basic Law, in
164. Id. at ¶ 246.
165. David P. Currie, Lochner Abroad: Substantive Due Process and Equal

Protection in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 333, 358 (1989).
166. See, e.g., id. at 354 (“Article 2(2) has also been the most prolific source of
decision recognizing the affirmative duty of the state to protect the individual from
harm inflicted by third parties.”).
167. G.G. art. 2 (emphasis added).
168. Urgenda Found. v. Neth., HA ZA 13-1396 The Hague Dist. Ct. ¶ 4.49
(Chamber for Comm. Affairs June 24, 2015) (under appeal) (quoting Manual on
Human Rights and the Environment, Council of Europe (2012)),
http://www.urgenda.nl/documents/VerdictDistrictCourt-UrgendavStaat24.06.2015.pdf; see also L.C.B. v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 23413/94 ¶
36., Öneryildiz v. Turkey [GC], Application no. 48939/99, Borysiewicz v. Poland,
Application no. 71146/01 ¶ 53.; Budayeva and Others v. Russia, Application no.
15339/02.; Murillo Saldias and Others v. Spain, Application no. 76973/01 (all cited
in Complaint of Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz v. Schweizerische
Bundeskanzlei (Nov. 2016) (decision pending)); see generally BERTRAND MATHIEU,
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Germany the ECHR and its interpretation by the European Court of
Human Rights “must be relied on as an interpretation aid in the
interpretation of the fundamental rights and rule-of-law principles of
the Basic Law.”169 Moreover, the “right to life” in Article 40.3 of the
Irish Constitution and Article 9 of the Pakistani Constitution have been
interpreted to entail environmental rights in their respective
jurisdictions.170 Additional pending complaints also assert the right to
climate protection under other “right to life” provisions.171 Indeed,
“[m]any scholars have argued that because clean air, clean water,
fertile soil and functioning ecosystems are integral to human survival
and well-being, they must be included in the rights to life and
health.”172
It is easy to see how an argument under Article 2(2) G.G. could take
shape in Germany. During debate on the environmental amendment to
the Basic Law, the Greens emphasized that Article 2 necessarily
“includes the right to clean air” and other environmental protections,
without which the enumerated rights are compromised.173 And as
Kunig explained in his analysis of Article 2, “[t]he right to life can
THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CASE-LAW
11-14 (2006) (comparing right to life in ECHR and European national constitutions).
169. BverfG, Judgment of the Second Senate, 2 BvR 2365/09, ¶ 86-94 (May 4,
2011), http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/
2011/05/rs20110504_2bvr236509en.html. This “serves to give the guarantees of the
European Convention on Human Rights as extensive an application in the Federal
Republic of Germany as possible. . . .” Id. at. ¶ 90. A complete analysis of ECHR
jurisprudence vis-à-vis a state duty to protect from climate change is beyond the
scope of this Article.
170. See Friends of the Irish Environment CLG v. Fingal County Council, et al.,
[2017] IEHC 695 ¶ 263 (Nov. 21, 2017); Leghari v. Republic of Pakistan, Case No.
W.P. No. 25501/2015, Order, 5-6 ¶ 7 (Lahore High Court, Sept. 14, 2015),
https://elaw.org/system/files/pk.leghari.091415_0.pdf.
171. See, e.g., Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz v. Schweizerische
Bundeskanzlei, Complaint (Federal Administrative Court, Nov. 25, 2016) (citing
Article 10 of the Swiss Constitution) translated in http://klimaseniorinnen.ch/wpcontent/uploads/2017/05/request_KlimaSeniorinnen.pdf.
172. David R. Boyd, The Implicit Constitutional Right to Live in a Healthy
Environment, 20 REV. EUROPEAN COMM’Y & INT’L ENVTL. L. 171, 171 (citation
omitted).
173. See, e.g., DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, PLENARPROTOKOLL 11/8, 382 (Apr. 2,
198) (Ger.), http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/11/11008.pdf#P.387 (statements of
Frau Garbe).
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become relevant in environmental law if the government avails itself,
or permits or tolerates measures which adversely affect the
environment and endanger life.”174 This framing has its limitations, to
be sure, but a complainant could argue climate change is a unique
existential threat to the protected right to life. The complainant could
argue that the government is permitting and tolerating an energy
consumption system – ranging from lignite mining and coal burning
to fossil fuel-based transportation – that endangers life by exacerbating
climate change.
A case challenging the German government’s consent to the storage
of American chemical weapons in Germany, the Chemical Weapons
Case, helps illuminate how the court would handle a climate change
claim under Article 2.175 In Chemical Weapons, the complainants
argued, inter alia, the state’s failure to prevent or adequately regulate
the storage of chemical weapons exposed them to unconstitutional
risks of bodily harm in the event of accidents or sabotage.176 They
argued this “neglected the protective obligations incumbent on it [the
state], arising out of the objective legal content of the basic right to life
and inviolability of the person.”177 The court ultimately denied the
claim under the particular facts of the case, but did not rule out a
different outcome in other cases. The court cited the government’s
broad powers to assess and evaluate its own compliance with the
protective obligations under Article 2, which “can be reviewed by the
courts only to a limited extent, depending on the nature of the area at
issue, the possibilities of arriving at an adequately certain judgment
and the importance of the legal goods at stake.”178

174. P. Kunig, supra note 111, at 325 (citing J. Schabe, Krankenversorgung und
Verfassungsrecht, 22 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 2,274 (1969)).
175. In re Chemical Weapons Storage, BVerfGE 77, 170 2 BvR 624/83, Ruling,
Oct. 29, 1987, translated in https://law.utexas.edu/transnational/foreign-lawtranslations/german/case.php?id=568. Regarding procedural matters, the court found
standing despite an uncertainty regarding the location of the chemical weapons in
Germany (id. at ¶ IV.B.2.b) and determined there were no statute of limitations issues
because the complaint was directed at an omission by the public authorities (id. at ¶
IV.B.2.b.bb (indicating that the time limits of BVerfGG ¶ 93 do not apply in that
situation)).
176. Id. at ¶ IV.B.2.b.cc (internal citation omitted).
177. Id. at ¶ A.II.3 (citing G.G. art. 2(2)).
178. Id. at ¶ IV.B.I.2.b.2.cc (citing BVerfGE 50, 290 [332 f.]).
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Despite rejecting the claims, the court in Chemical Weapons
reaffirmed that a constitutional complaint is an appropriate vehicle for
seeking protection under Article 2 G.G.179 The court noted that:
[t]he fact that Article 2(2), first sentence, Basic Law does not
merely guarantee a subjective right to protection but at the
same time constitutes an objective legal value-decision of
the constitution applying in all areas of the legal system and
establishing constitutional protective obligations has been
recognized in a consistent case law on both Senates of the
Federal Constitutional Court.180
Granted, “[i]t is only in very special circumstances” that the court
may restrict the government’s freedom of action,181 but a climate
litigant could argue insufficient protection against the profound and
certain threats from climate change constitutes a very special
circumstance. Faced with substantial evidence, courts in other
jurisdictions have overcome similar separation of powers barriers.182
The Chemical Weapons court also provided a test for future Article
2 constitutional complaints, such as a climate complaint. Any
complainant must “conclusively show” that the public authorities have
(1) “either not taken protective measures at all,” or (2) “that manifestly
the regulations and measures adopted are entirely unsuitable or
completely inadequate to secure the object of protection.”183 The

179. Id.
180. Id. (citing BVerfGE 39, 1 [41 f.]; 46, 160 [164]; 49, 89 [141 f.]; 53, 30 [57];

56, 54 [73, 78, 80]).
181. Id.
182. See, e.g., Urgenda Found. v. Neth., HA ZA 13-1396 The Hague Dist. Ct.
(Chamber for Comm. Affairs June 24, 2015) (under appeal), http://www.urgenda.nl/
documents/VerdictDistrictCourt-UrgendavStaat-24.06.2015.pdf; Friends of the Irish
Environment CLG v. Fingal County Council, et al., [2017] IEHC 695 ¶ 263 (Nov.
21, 2017); Leghari v. Republic of Pakistan, Case No. W.P. No. 25501/2015, Order,
5-6 ¶ 7 (Lahore High Court, Sept. 14, 2015), https://elaw.org/system/files/pk.leghari.
091415_0.pdf.
183. In re Chemical Weapons Storage, BVerfGE 77, 170 2 BvR 624/83, Ruling,
Oct. 29, 1987, translated in https://law.utexas.edu/transnational/foreign-lawtranslations/german/case.php?id=568; see also id. (“If the complainant wishes to
claim that the public authority can meet its protective obligation only by taking a
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complainant in Chemical Weapons did not meet this burden, but
perhaps a climate complainant could, armed with substantial scientific
research and publications. Indeed, the Urgenda court concluded that
the Dutch government’s protective measures were inadequate.184
Similarly, the German government’s own assessment establishes that
Germany’s efforts are inadequate to reduce the country’s GHG
emissions to the level the government deemed necessary,185 suggesting
the possible success of a climate related constitutional complaint.
Justice Mahrenholz’s dissent in Chemical Weapons provides even
more fodder for a rights-based climate case.186 The dissent cited a case
involving nuclear power plants which indicated “the fundamental right
under Article 2(2) Basic Law is infringed not only by actual
encroachment on the objects of legal protection therein. . . . Instead,
such actual contravention is to be forestalled, so that the fundamental
right can enter where precautionary measures against later operating
risks are neglected. . . .”187 Article 2’s protection of unborn human life
also touches on this concept.188 Thus, a climate litigant need not wait
until dangerous climate change arrives and is undeniable; a
complainant may seek to prevent the foreseeable harm before it
happens.

very specific measure, he must also conclusively show this and the nature of the
measure to be taken.”).
184. Urgenda at ¶ 4.84-4.89
185. See FEDERAL MINISTRY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, Nature Conservation,
Building and Nuclear Safety, German Climate Policy, https://www.cop23.de/en/
bmub/german-climate-policy/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2018); Michael Bauchmüller,
Deutschland hinkt seinem Klimaziel hinterher, SÜDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG (Oct. 11,
2017)
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/klimawandel-deutschland-hinktseinem-klimaziel-hinterher-1.3702329 [http://perma.cc/6VML-ZHX7] (citing a
leaked internal ministry paper that predicts Germany’s emissions will be 31.7 to 32.5
percent below 1990 levels).
186. In re Chemical Weapons Storage, BVerfGE 77, 170 2 BvR 624/83, Ruling,
Oct. 29, 1987 (J. Mahrenholz, dissenting); see also KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note
109, at 399 (referring to the dissent as “eloquent”).
187. In re Chemical Weapons Storage, BVerfGE 77, 170 2 BvR 624/83, Ruling,
Oct. 29, 1987, Dissent at ¶ II.2.a (citing BVerfGE 53, 30 [57]).
188. See Abortion Cases, 39 BVerfGE 1 (1975) and 88 BVerfGE 203 (1993) (also
relying on Article 1 human dignity).
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2. Equal Protection
Article 3(1) G.G. further guarantees that “[a]ll persons shall be equal
before the law.”189 On equal protection claims, the court applies an
arbitrariness or “rationality” test to unequal treatment,190 and
heightened or “special”191 scrutiny for acts or omissions affecting other
constitutionally protected interests.192 One Constitutional Court
Justice has argued that G.G. Article 20’s “social state principle”
demands heightened scrutiny of unequal treatment related to social
welfare.193 The environmental state goal in Basic Law Article 20a is
viewed similarly to the principle at Article 20, suggesting at least one
Justice would open the door to heightened scrutiny of the state’s failure
to protect future generations from existential threats to the
environment, even though it is not an enumerated fundamental right.194
The jurisprudence on the tests for heightened scrutiny is somewhat
inconsistent,195 but Professor Somek summarizes a recent test as
follows:

189. G.G. art. 3(1).
190. See KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 109, at 421 (citing 1 BVerfGE 14, 52
(1951)).
191. See e.g. In re Life Imprisonment, 45 BVerfGE 187 (1977) (Reprinted in part
in KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 109, at 364) (applying “special scrutiny under
the principle of proportionality”). See generally Currie, supra note 165.
192. See KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 109, at 421 and 422 (quoting 88
BVerfGE 87 (1993)); Currie, supra note 165; Alexander Somek, The Deadweight of
Formulae: What Might Have Been the Second Germanization of American Equal
Protection Review, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 284, 314 (1998) (“Some commentators,
therefore, have posited the evolution of a two-tiered scheme of general equal
protection review which incorporates the proportionality principle on its higher level,
triggered by treatments that are suspect because they affect single groups or burden
other constitutional rights.”).
193. Currie, supra note 165, at 369 (citing 36 BVerfGE 237, 248-50 (Rupp-von
Brünneck, J., dissenting)).
194. See e.g. DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, PLENARPROTOKOLL 11/8, 379 (Apr. 2,
1987) (Ger.), http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/11/11008.pdf#P.387 (statement of
Dr. Hauff) (“We want environmental protection to be included in our constitution . . .
as a state goal. Environmental protection, like the welfare state, must be a
commitment to all state action.”).
195. See generally, Somek, supra note 192.
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where groups are treated unequally and in instances where
one can expect a negative impact on the exercise of other
basic rights, a more searching inquiry is necessary into
whether reasons of such a kind and weight that could justify
the imposition of unequal legal consequences exist.196
Another scholar described the court’s analysis as a “search for a
reason ‘sufficient to justify’ the challenged distinction.”197 In many
ways the protections of Article 3(1) are similar to those of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution.198 The German Constitutional Court has cited U.S. Equal
Protection Clause jurisprudence with approval, suggesting it could be
persuasive authority, although of no precedential value.199 Therefore,
a German litigant’s claims are likely to reflect some of the Equal
Protection Clause arguments proffered by the plaintiffs in Juliana v.
United States, which frames the inequity as between distinct groups of
present and future generations.200 The plaintiffs in Juliana argue, inter
alia, that the United States’ fossil fuel production and consumption
cause irreversible climate change, consequently denying the youth
plaintiffs “the same protection of fundamental rights afforded to prior
and present generations of adult citizens.”201 The “acts of Defendants
unconstitutionally favor the present, temporary economic benefits of
certain citizens, especially corporations, over Plaintiffs’ rights to life,
196. See id. at 317 & 320. Professor Somek described one formula as follows: “the
German Court first held that this Clause is violated . . . if a group of norm-addressees
is treated differently from another group, although the differences between those
groups are not of such a kind or such a weight as to justify the unequal treatment.”
Id. at 308 (citing BVerfGE 55, 72 (88)).
197. Currie, supra note 165, at 369.
198. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIX, (“[No State shall] deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); see also Currie, supra note 165, at
368.
199. See, e.g., Somek, supra note 192, at 287. Professor Somek noted “[i]n the
1980s, the German Court began borrowing from the United States Supreme Court’s
equal protection jurisprudence. . . .” and concluded, inter alia, “the German Court
has attempted to apply borrowed constitutional provisions in such a matter that
routinely falls short of meeting the German Court’s idealized approach to equal
protection review.” Id. at 288 (discussing various standards of equal protection).
200. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1,224.
201. Complaint, Juliana v. United States, D. Or. Case No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC, Dkt.
7 ¶ 292 (filed Sept. 10, 2015).
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liberty, and property.”202 As of this writing, the level of scrutiny
applied and whether those claims are successful in the District of
Oregon remain to be seen.203 A recent ruling from the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals has increased the odds that the court will reach the
merits in Juliana, reaffirming it as an important case for prospective
German complainants to watch.204
In Germany, a litigant could argue that the state’s failure to protect
requires heightened scrutiny because of (1) the weight of the rights
being infringed, (2) the weight of the public interest at issue, and (3)
the significance of the differences between the affected groups.205
First, the generational inequity from climate change infringes the
state’s constitutional “responsibility toward future generations” to
“protect the natural foundations of life,”206 as well as other
fundamental rights.207 Second, the existential threat from climate
change and its foreseeable harms are profound matters of public
interest with the potential to impact everyone. Finally, the complainant
could assert that the reference to “future generations” in the
Grundgesetz highlights the significance of the difference between
generational groups, tilting the balance to heightened scrutiny of the
state’s acts and omissions that disproportionately affects youth and
future Germans.208 Under heightened scrutiny, the state must justify
the generational inequity of its failure to protect.209 It is difficult to
predict whether the Court could find sufficient justification for state
action and inaction that disproportionately harms future generations on
such a scale as climate change.

202. Id. at ¶ 301.
203. See Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1,249, n.7.
204. United States v. United States Dist. Court, No. 17-71692, D.C. No. 6:15-cv-

01517-TC-AA, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 5770 (9th Cir. 2018) (denying federal
government’s petition for writ of mandamus).
205. See Somek, supra note 192, at 321 (indicating a German court could put the
emphasis on the “significance of the differences between groups,” or on “the relative
weight of the public interest or the infringement of the right.”).
206. G.G. art. 20a.
207. See infra, Section II.B.
208. G.G. art. 20a.
209. G.G. art. 3(1).
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3. Property Rights
The fundamental right to property is another potential basis for
suit.210 Although subject to limitations, under the Basic Law the state
is “obliged affirmatively to preserve and foster” this right.211 In their
extensive reference on German constitutional jurisprudence,
Professors Donald Kommers and Russell Miller explain:
[t]o use the standard formulation, the right to property is an
objective constitutional value that the state is obliged
affirmatively to preserve and foster. Exactly and precisely
what positive duty the state has under this theory has never
been laid out in full. But some commentators have suggested
that the objective character of Article 14 may require, for
example, environmental protection legislation to preserve
the value of property, the productive use of which depends
on clean water and unspoiled forests.212
With foreseeable sea level rise, extreme weather patterns and others,
the impact of climate change on property is manifest.213 Indeed, Lliuya
v. RWE, a civil case against the energy company RWE for climatechange induced property damage, is moving forward in a German
court.214 That court indicated “even a party who acts lawfully must be
liable for property damage caused by him.”215 And in the seminal case
210. G.G. art. 14.
211. KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 109, at 634.
212. Id. (citing P. Kunig, supra note 111, at 326-27, and Georg Ress, The Right to

Property under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany 10 (paper
delivered at Notre Dame German-American Constitutional Law Conference, Apr.
1986)).
213. See e.g. Christina Ross, Evan Mills & Sean B. Hecht, Insurance RiskManagement Strategies in the Context of Global Climate Change, 26 STAN. ENVTL.
L. J. 251, 276-282 (2007) (“Climate change has the potential to affect virtually all
segments of the property-casualty insurance business, including those covering
damages to property, crops, and livestock; business interruptions; supply chain
disruptions, or loss of utility service; equipment breakdown arising from extreme
temperature events; and data loss from power surges or outages.”).
214. Order, Saúl Luciano Lliuya v. RWE AG, Higher Regional Court of Hamm
(Nov. 30, 2017), unofficially translated in https://germanwatch.org/en/download/
20812.pdf.
215. Id. at ¶ 2.
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Massachusetts v. EPA, the United States Supreme Court focused on
climate-change induced impacts to coastal state property as a concrete
harm for standing purposes.216
A constitutional claim against the state under Article 14 would be
more difficult than a civil claim, but has the potential to bolster a
German complaint. It is generally understood that the property
guarantee of Article 14(1) only permits the state to infringe individual
property rights “in accordance with legal requirements, and for public
purposes that are more important than the individual property
guarantee.”217 Unlike the U.S. Constitution, “[t]he function of Article
14 is not primarily to prevent the taking of property without
compensation . . . but rather to secure existing property in the hands of
its owners.”218 Although an exception allows expropriation of property
“for the public good,” it is only “pursuant to a law that determines the
nature and extent of compensation.” The German Federal Government
certainly has not enacted such compensation vis-a-vis climate-change
induced property loss and to be constitutional, the court would need to
find that climate-change-induced property loss is a “public good”
justifying the expropriation, an unlikely conclusion.219
Indeed, the German basic right to property “protects the individual
against every unjustified infringement of the entire range of protected
interests.”220 Considering the affirmative protective obligation for
fundamental rights, there is an argument to be made that the state’s
216. Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 522-23 (2007).
217. Rebecca Lubens, The Social Obligation of Property Ownership: A

Comparison of German and U.S. Law, 24 ARIZ. J. INT’L COMP. LAW 389, 407-08
(2007).
218. Id. at 416 (quoting Deichordnung case, BVerfG 1968, 24 BVerfGE 367 (389)
(F.R.G.), translated in NORMAN DORSEN, MICHEL ROSENFELD, ANDREAS SAJO &
SUSANNE BAER, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: CASES AND MATERIALS 1162
(2003), also quoted in translation in KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 109, at 633));
see KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 109, at 631 (“For the most part, the Federal
Constitutional Court has resolved the tension at work in Article 14 to the advantage
of the individual liberty interest secured in the article’s first paragraph.” (citing
Hamburg Flood Case, 24 BVerfGE 367 (1968))).
219. G.G. art. 14(3); see KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 109, at 631 (“In short,
Parliament’s authority to define the content and limits of the right to property
pursuant to Article 14(1)[2] cannot be interpreted to permit legislation that interferes
with the essence of the right.”).
220. KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 109, at 633 (quoting Hamburg Flood Case,
24 BVerfGE 367 ¶ E.III.1.b (1968)).
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failure to protect property from foreseeable climate change destruction
is a cognizable constitutional claim.221 However, Article 14
jurisprudence generally involves specific regulations or targeted
expropriations that cause property damage or loss. For this reason, a
climate change complaint could also attempt to show that specific
governmental action, such as permitting lignite mines or coal-fired
power plants, causes property loss due to climate change. Showing
causation will be challenging, but Lliuya v. RWE suggests it is possible
with the right expert opinions and evidence.222
CONCLUSION
With rights-based climate litigation gaining traction, there is no
reason to think litigants in Germany will stay on the sidelines. The
odds are that the Federal Constitutional Court will see a rights-based
climate complaint in the near future. A German complaint is likely to
piggyback on (1) the “duty of care to take [climate change] mitigation
measures” in the Netherlands, (2) the recognized “right to an
environment that is consistent with the human dignity and well being
of citizens at large” in Ireland, and (3) the “right to a climate system
capable of sustaining human life” in the United States, among others.
The constitutional structure in Germany and the jurisprudence of the
Constitutional Court suggest the Court would recognize a similar right
to an environment that maintains life for future generations. The
environmental state goal of Grundgesetz Article 20a, bolstered by the
German fundamental rights to life, equal protection, and property
provide a framework on which to base an as of yet unenumerated
constitutional right to a life-sustaining environment. On the global
stage, it would not be an unprecedented step for the Constitutional
Court to link such an environmental right to duties related to climate
change mitigation.
Whether a German litigant could succeed in holding the government
liable for failing to protect against infringement of this right is another
matter. Scientific consensus indicates that the worst foreseeable effects
of anthropogenic climate change could infringe such a right by causing
droughts and extreme heat waves, increasing the intensity of natural
221. See KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 109, at 634.
222. Order, Saúl Luciano Lliuya v. RWE AG, Higher Regional Court of Hamm

(Nov. 30, 2017), translated in https://germanwatch.org/en/download/20812.pdf.
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disasters, and creating conditions for epidemics, to name a few.223 The
scientific evidence for these probable effects opens the door to a legal
claim. Yet, even if a court agrees that there is a constitutional right to
a certain environmental quality that climate change threatens, the
complainant would still need to show that Germany’s actions (or lack
thereof) are so egregious that it violates that right. After all, climate
change is a global problem in a complicated ecological system that
Germany cannot solve on its own. Not all courts that have recognized
an environmental right have found liability and ordered relief.
Germany has already reduced its emissions by approximately 27.3%
compared to its 1990 levels. 224 Therefore, Germany’s lack of more
aggressive progress is not as egregious as that of the Netherlands,
which the Court in Urgenda held was so flagrant that the Netherland’s
had breached its duty of care to its citizens. Indeed, as of 2016,
Germany had already achieved the reductions that the Urgenda court
ordered the Netherlands to take by 2020.225 This all weighs heavily
against the likelihood that the Constitutional Court would find liability
for Germany and order relief. However, by the German government’s
own measure, Germany is not doing enough to reduce its GHG
emissions. The German government previously determined that
reducing its 2020 emissions to 40% of its 1990 levels was necessary,
which could be a standard the Court adopts. Now that it is clear that
Germany’s current path will not achieve this reduction, a court could
grant relief mandating more aggressive action.
Although the likelihood of success on a rights-based climate claim
seems slight, ten years ago it would have seemed fanciful. As the
pathways for effective climate change mitigation diminish, locking the
planet into a destructive trajectory, court involvement is becoming

223. See generally, e.g., Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate
Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability (2014), http://www.ipcc.ch/
report/ar5/wg2/.
224. See Federal Environment Agency (Umwelt Bundesamt), Climate Gas
Emissions Rose Again in 2016, (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/
presse/pressemitteilungen/klimagasemissionen-stiegen-im-jahr-2016-erneut-an
[http://perma.cc/WB3C-QAAM].
225. See Urgenda Found. v. Neth., HA ZA 13-1396 The Hague Dist. Ct. ¶ 5.1
(Chamber for Comm. Affairs June 24, 2015) (under appeal), http://www.urgenda.nl/
documents/VerdictDistrictCourt-UrgendavStaat-24.06.2015.pdf (ordering a 25%
reduction below 1990 levels).
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increasingly accepted. Someday soon, the German Constitutional
Court may have its chance to join the fray.

